论文标题
Imdfence:构建针对可植入医疗设备的安全协议
IMDfence: Architecting a Secure Protocol for Implantable Medical Devices
论文作者
论文摘要
在过去的十年中,关注可植入医疗设备(IMD)的安全性和隐私方面的关注加剧了,这是由于在各种现有设备中发现的许多网络安全脆弱性所驱动。但是,由于其严格的计算,能量和物理约束,常规安全协议不直接适用于IMD。相反,已经提出了量身定制的方案,但是,这些方案无法涵盖现代IMD及其生态系统如此迫切要求的全部安全功能。在本文中,我们提出了Imdfence,这是IMD生态系统的安全协议,该协议提供了全面而实用的安全投资组合,其中包括可用性,非替代,访问控制,实体身份验证,远程监视和系统可扩展性。该协议还允许紧急访问,从而在不损害安全性和患者安全的情况下优雅地降级提供的服务。对安全协议的性能及其对现代IMD的可行性和影响进行了广泛的分析和评估。我们发现,IMDFENCE的总IMD能源消耗仅增加了上述安全性要求,分别增加了系统延迟和内存足迹的14 ms和9 KB。
Over the past decade, focus on the security and privacy aspects of implantable medical devices (IMDs) has intensified, driven by the multitude of cybersecurity vulnerabilities found in various existing devices. However, due to their strict computational, energy and physical constraints, conventional security protocols are not directly applicable to IMDs. Custom-tailored schemes have been proposed instead which, however, fail to cover the full spectrum of security features that modern IMDs and their ecosystems so critically require. In this paper we propose IMDfence, a security protocol for IMD ecosystems that provides a comprehensive yet practical security portfolio, which includes availability, non-repudiation, access control, entity authentication, remote monitoring and system scalability. The protocol also allows emergency access that results in the graceful degradation of offered services without compromising security and patient safety. The performance of the security protocol as well as its feasibility and impact on modern IMDs are extensively analyzed and evaluated. We find that IMDfence achieves the above security requirements at a mere less than 7% increase in total IMD energy consumption, and less than 14 ms and 9 kB increase in system delay and memory footprint, respectively.