论文标题
策略性设施的位置机制具有更丰富的动作空间
Strategyproof Facility Location Mechanisms with Richer Action Spaces
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究设施的位置问题，代理控制多个位置以及报告其位置时可以选择隐藏某些位置（隐藏），报告某些位置不止一次（复制）并介绍其位置（操纵）。我们完全表征了所有设施的位置机制，这些机制在此环境中具有更丰富的战略行为方面具有匿名，高效且具有战略意义。我们还提供有关操纵的特征。据我们所知，这是第一个对策略防护设施的位置机制的表征，每个代理都控制多个位置。
We study facility location problems where agents control multiple locations and when reporting their locations can choose to hide some locations (hiding), report some locations more than once (replication) and lie about their locations (manipulation). We fully characterize all facility location mechanisms that are anonymous, efficient, and strategyproof with respect to the richer strategic behavior for this setting. We also provide a characterization with respect to manipulation only. This is the first, to the best of our knowledge, characterization result for the strategyproof facility location mechanisms where each agent controls multiple locations.
