论文标题
排队优先级的最佳机制
An optimal mechanism charging for priority in a queue
论文作者
论文摘要
我们得出了一种收入最大化计划，该计划向他们的等待成本参数收取同质的客户，以随机费用，以便成为溢价客户。该计划激励所有客户以其抽奖价格购买优先级。我们还针对客户在等待成本参数方面是异质的情况，设计了一种收入最大化计划。现在，鼓励较低的成本参数客户以低廉的价格加入高级课程：鉴于那些具有高成本参数的人将愿意为此特权支付更多费用。
We derive a revenue-maximizing scheme that charges customers who are homogeneous with respect to their waiting cost parameter for a random fee in order to become premium customers. This scheme incentivizes all customers to purchase priority, each at his/her drawn price. We also design a revenue-maximizing scheme for the case where customers are heterogeneous with respect to their waiting cost parameter. Now lower cost parameter customers are encouraged to join the premium class at a low price: Given that, those with high cost parameter would be willing to pay even more for this privilege.
