论文标题
正常游戏中的基于距离的平衡
Distance-based Equilibria in Normal-Form Games
论文作者
论文摘要
我们建议对正常游戏中的代理模型进行简单的不确定性修改；在任何给定的策略配置文件中，代理只能访问与实际操作配置文件一定距离内的一组“可能的配置文件”。我们研究了代理商使用众所周知的理由选择她的策略的各种实例，例如考虑到最坏的情况或试图最大程度地减少遗憾，以应对这种不确定性。行为模型中的任何这种修饰自然都会引起相应的平衡概念。基于距离的平衡。我们表征了各种平衡之间的关系，以及它们与众所周知的现有解决方案概念（例如颤抖的人的完美）之间的联系。此外，我们提供了存在结果，并表明对于某些类别的游戏，这种解决方案概念实际上可以带来更好的结果。
We propose a simple uncertainty modification for the agent model in normal-form games; at any given strategy profile, the agent can access only a set of "possible profiles" that are within a certain distance from the actual action profile. We investigate the various instantiations in which the agent chooses her strategy using well-known rationales e.g., considering the worst case, or trying to minimize the regret, to cope with such uncertainty. Any such modification in the behavioral model naturally induces a corresponding notion of equilibrium; a distance-based equilibrium. We characterize the relationships between the various equilibria, and also their connections to well-known existing solution concepts such as Trembling-hand perfection. Furthermore, we deliver existence results, and show that for some class of games, such solution concepts can actually lead to better outcomes.
