论文标题
为什么竞争市场会融合到第一价格拍卖？
Why Do Competitive Markets Converge to First-Price Auctions?
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑一个设置，在该设置中，投标人参与由不同卖家进行的多个拍卖，并优化了其出价\ emph {gentregate}拍卖。我们通过在卖方之间制定游戏来分析这种设置，卖方的策略是选择拍卖以进行。我们的分析旨在阐明展示广告市场格局的最新变化：在这里，广告交换（卖方）主要是在早些时候进行第二代价拍卖，随着时间的流逝，它们转向了第一价拍卖的变体，最终在Google的AD交换中最终转向了2019年的首要拍卖。我们的模型和结果是在竞争中的竞争方式，以此为何竞争，以便为何竞争竞争，以便为何竞争竞争。
We consider a setting in which bidders participate in multiple auctions run by different sellers, and optimize their bids for the \emph{aggregate} auction. We analyze this setting by formulating a game between sellers, where a seller's strategy is to pick an auction to run. Our analysis aims to shed light on the recent change in the Display Ads market landscape: here, ad exchanges (sellers) were mostly running second-price auctions earlier and over time they switched to variants of the first-price auction, culminating in Google's Ad Exchange moving to a first-price auction in 2019. Our model and results offer an explanation for why the first-price auction occurs as a natural equilibrium in such competitive markets.
